This paper studies the impact of mergers on corporate performance. It compares the pre-and post-merger operating performance of the corporations involved in merger to identify their financial characteristics. Also, the effect on merger-induced monopoly profits is identified by looking at the persistence profile of the profits. Taking a sample of 36 cases of merger between 1992 and 1995, it is seen that there are no significant differences in the financial characteristics of the two firms involved in merger. The mergers seem to lead to financial synergies and a one-time growth. The analysis of the regression to norm shows that there is no increase in the postmerger profits. The competitive process is not impeded with merger even when no strong anti-trust laws are present.
The Indian corporate sector has experienced a major restructuring through mergers and acquisitions, with the changes brought about by the Industrial Policy Resolution of June 1991. During the period from January 1985 to December 1991, 58 mergers and 127 acquisitions of companies registered under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP), 1969, were approved by the government. 1 In the post 1991 period, there has been a sharp increase in the overall number of mergers and acquisitions. Studies by Khanna (1998) 2 and Basant (2000) 3 , have well documented the response of the Indian corporate sector to the New Industrial Policy with reference to the merger and acquisition activity, the change in the shareholding pattern, adoption of product differentiation, and other corporate strategies. Khanna (1998) 2 finds that the withdrawal of all monopoly restraints in acquisitions has resulted in several markets becoming oligopolistic, with a reduction in competition. Around 60 per cent of all mergers in India were found to be horizontal in nature. The study by Basant (2000) also finds that more than 50 per cent of the mergers were horizontal and 16 per cent were vertical in nature. The focus of this study was from the industry point of view, where various performance indicators like profitability rates, export performance as well as export to import ratio were found to have varied trends across industry groups.
In this article 4 we change the focus from the effect of merger at the industry level to the effect at the firm level. This study analyses the post-merger operating performance of the acquiring firm and attempts to identify the sources of merger-induced changes. The analysis of regression to norm is done to identify whether competitive forces would have led to profit changes even if the merger had not occurred. This study shows that merger did not lead to Vikalpa improved performance. The only significant gains to the acquired firm were through an increased leverage. The analysis further shows that mergers did not lead to excess profits for the acquiring firm.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 gives a brief literature survey; Section 2 gives the description of the sample used; Section 3 attempts to identify the characteristics that distinguish the acquirers from the acquired firms and to find the effect of merger on these characteristics. Section 4 develops and tests the model that examines the effect of merger on the performance of the firm. Section 5 discusses the implications and concludes.
Literature Survey
Studies of the post-merger performance usually follow either of the two general approaches: share-price analysis or analysing the operating performance. Empirical research on share-price performance suggests that anticipated merger gains are not accomplished. The acquiring firm generally earns positive returns prior to announcements, but less than the market portfolio in the post-merger period (Servaes, 1994; Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Asquith, 1983) . Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) examine the target line of business performance using operating earnings. They find no strong evidence of improvements in performance for these target lines of business after the merger. Their analysis of merger effect on regression of profits to norm shows that regression to norm exists and is faster for the merging firms as compared to the nonmerging firms. They conclude that acquisition activity lowers profitability and that part of this was due to the regression to norm from unsustainably high pre-merger performance. Cosh et al., (1998) attempt to identify successful mergers based on the pre-merger characteristics, the impact of financial institutions as shareowners on the merger outcome, and finally the effect of mergers in the framework of the regression to norm. Overall, they find that size was significantly different for the acquirers and the acquired firms. The analysis of persistence Vol. 26, No. 1, January-March 2001 20 of profits shows that regression to norm exits in the absence of mergers and is reinforced by their presence. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) integrate accounting and stock return data in a consistent form to permit richer tests of corporate control theories. They find a strong positive relation between post-merger increases in operating cash flows and abnormal stock returns at merger announcements indicating that expectations of economic improvements explain a significant portion of the equity revaluation of the merging firm.
Studies of mergers in India are few and have stopped at comparing pre-merger and postmerger performance using a case by case approach (Kaveri, 1986) or a general description of mergers and takeovers and their accounting framework (Kumar and Parchure, 1990) .
In the present study, we attempt to analyse the pre-and post-merger operating performance of the acquiring firm and to identify the sources of merger-induced changes. Secondly, the effect of merger-induced monopoly profits are identified by looking at the persistence of profits in the regression to norm framework used by Cosh et al, (1998) developed earlier by Mueller (1986) to study the effect of mergers.
Data Description
The sample consists of 36 firms engaged in a merger over the period from 1992 to 1995 (Appendix). The firms were selected such that data were available for the pre-merger (four years prior to the merger) period for acquirers and acquired firms and post-merger (three years after the merger) data were available for the new entity. Capitaline-Ole database was used as the base for collecting the data.
In addition to 36 acquiring firms, a matched sample of 36 non-acquiring firms was drawn from the same database. The matched firm was selected from the same industry 5 and size group 1 ' as the acquirer. Size was measured by net assets 7 in the year prior to the year of merger. The average asset size of the acquiring firms was Rs 70.48 crore while the average of the matched sample was Rs 58.53 crore in the year of merger and was measured for the same chronological time period. The main objective of matching the time period was to make some allowance for the overall market effect (which includes differences over time in general economic conditions) on the firm performance. Matching by the time period allowed for possible industry effects as well. To control for the industry differences and changes in the economic environment, all financial variables were measured as differences from the average values for other companies in their industry groups.
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Characteristics of Merging Firms and the Effect of Merger
This section describes certain factors that could distinguish the acquirer and the acquired firm from the industry and also from each other. A comparison of these factors for the pre-and postmerger period would yield some insights regarding the effect of merger. The list of variables used has been described in Box 1.
Box 1: Description of the Various Variables Used in the Present Study
The measures of profitability used here are:
• PREPROF : Pre-merger profitability, measured as the operating return on assets (profit before interest depreciation and tax on net assets), averaged over the three pre-merger years (t-3) to (t-1).
• PREFIMP : Short-run improvements in performance measured by the change in operating return over the three pre-merger years [(t-1) less (t-3)].
• POSTPROF : Post-merger profitability measured by the operating return on net assets averaged over the three post-merger years (t+1) to (t+3).
• WPREPROF : Weighted average pre-merger profitability of the acquirer and the acquired measured as operating profits over net assets, weighted by net assets and averaged over the three pre-merge years. The growth rate is defined as:
• PREGRO : Pre-merger growth, average growth rate in total assets in the three pre-merger years [that is, from (t-4) to (t-1) year].
• POSTGRO : Post-merger growth, average growth rate in total assets in the post-merger years [that is, from (t+1) to (t+3) year].
The leverage of the firm is given as:
• PREDE : Leverage ratio = total debt/ (total debt + equity capital), averaged over the three year period (t-3) to (t-1) prior to merger.
• POSTDE : Leverage ratio, averaged over the three year post-merger period (t+1) to (t+3). The measures used to capture the effect on tax are:
• PRETAX : Tax provision as a ratio of the operating profits, averaged over the three year period (t-3) to (t-1) prior to merger.
• POSTTAX: Tax provision as a ratio of the operating profits, averaged over the three year post-merger period (t+1) to (t+3). The variables used to measure liquidity are:
• PRELR : Liquidity ratio = [(current assets -inventory)/current liabilities], averaged over the three year period (t-3) to (t-1) prior to merger.
• POSTLR : Liquidity ratio, averaged over the three year post-merger period (t+1) to (t+3). The 'other' factors that could influence merger decision are proxied as:
• HORI : Dummy variable, 1 when acquirer and acquired belong to the same industry group and 0 otherwise.
• SUB : Dummy variable, 1 when acquirer and acquired belong to the same business group and 0 otherwise.
• BIFR : Dummy variable, 1 when merger took place because the acquired firm was under the BIFR and 0 otherwise.
Profitability
Mergers can raise or lower the profits of the two merging companies from what they would have been had they not merged. Most hypotheses as to why mergers occur assume that managers maximize profits (Mueller, 1986; Scherer, 1990) . The successful mergers raise the profitability of the merged firm. This increase in profitability could be due to enhanced monopoly or increase in efficiency. Similarly, any decrease in profitability is explained by the managerial theory of the firm. It considers that the managers pursue corporate growth at the cost of some current profits (Marris, 1964) .
The gains to the acquiring firm may come through economies of scope and scale that improve asset productivity by eliminating facilities that are underutilized if each firm operated separately. An alternate view of the impact of mergers on profitability emphasizes selection through the capital market (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Cosh et al, 1998) . This links premerger profit and growth performance to postmerger success. The causation here works through shifts in performance arising from movement toward the production possibility frontier. This argument is based on the view that merger leads to efficiency improvements not through any scale or complementary factors but simply through the replacement of inferior by superior management of existing assets in the market for corporate control. The average pre-merger profitability and the extent of shortrun improvements in pre-merger profits are used as independent variables to explain postmerger profitability.
Growth in Total Assets
The objective of the merger need not in all cases be the pursuit of profit but could be the pursuit of managerial self-interest which is not intended to improve profitability. These then may lead to the appearance of unsuccessful mergers in profit terms and account for the poor average performance post-merger which has been observed in many studies. The rate of growth of the firm in pre-merger period could then be used Vol. 26, No. 1, January-March 2001 as an explanatory variable to study its effect on post-merger firm profits.
In the context of mergers, there are two aspects of growth that can be studied. First, it can be the immediate (absolute) growth of the acquiring firm subsequent to the merger (compared with the pre-merger position). This growth is achieved by definition through merger. Second, one can compare the average annual rate of growth in the years prior to the merger and in the post-merger years, excluding the year of merger (t). What needs to be checked is whether merger contributes to its annual rate of growth of the firm in the years following the merger (excluding the year t of merger).
Leverage
Mergers provide an opportunity to eliminate under-investment problems arising from unused borrowing capacity. It is suggested that one reason for the firm takeover is shortage of longterm capital (Tzoannos and Samuels, 1972) . Lewellen (1971) claims that with merger, especially between firms operating in uncorrelated industries, if the income streams become more stable, then the lenders can increase the limits on lending to the newly created firm. This limit would be above the sum of the original limits that would be available for the merging parties individually. The leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to the total capital (total debt plus the equity capital).
Tax Savings
Mergers can result in tax savings to the acquiring firms.
9 Tax laws permit the deduction of interest payment in the calculation of taxable income. A source of tax savings is the accumulated loss of the acquired firm which is used in offsetting the profits of the acquiring firm. The extent of tax saving is proxied by taking the ratio of tax provision to the total operating profits.
Liquidity
Another motive advanced for mergers is the expected improvement in the liquidity of the acquiring firms. A firm hard pressed for liquid-ity might merge with one which abounds in liquid assets with the objective that the combined short-term financial situation will improve. Liquidity ratio measures the firm's ability to satisfy its current obligations. The more liquid the firm before a merger, the more likely it will not face liquidity problems if it assumes additional post-merger costs, such as higher interest payments. If, however, the firm is only marginally liquid at the time of merger, it may experience liquidity problems following the merger, unless it can rely on the other merger partner for additional liquidity (Tzoannos and Samuels, 1972) . The liquidity is measured as the ratio of current assets (net of inventories) to current liabilities.
Additional Factors Considered in Merger
As a corollary to the above stated characteristics, it has been suggested that the 'successful' merger outcomes that lead to higher profitability are more likely to be from the horizontal merger having similar operations. This is because diversification by large holding companies through mergers is likely to have problems of control loss and inferior post-merger performance (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) . On the other hand, the diversified firms could be easily integrated than in the case of horizontal acquisition. This could be due to the predominant divisionalized management structure in the typical large diversified firm and the acquisition of human as well as physical capital in the merger process. These approaches suggest that the direction of merger whether horizontal or unrelated could influence post-merger success.
The case of mergers between group or subsidiary firms has been very specific to the Indian firms. The formation of many group or subsidiary firms is attributed to the government policies which played an active role in the growth of the firm until 1991. The merger of the subsidiaries or group companies into the same firm has been a major part of the restructuring process to improve performance.
Some of this restructuring activity has also been driven by the directive given to revive sick units (firms) under the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). The BIFR was established under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. It has been playing a significant role in arranging merger of viable firms through package deals. These deals are done with the creditor financial institutions and banks in regard to the ways of future finance, continued business activity, and other changes in the business, if any. In our sample, there are 14 horizontal mergers, 24 mergers between subsidiary or group companies, and six mergers under the BIFR.
Characteristics of Firms Involved in a Merger
This section attempts to identify the characteristics of firms which distinguish them from those of the overall industry. Since the sample has an inherent selection bias (as they are only those firms which have gone in for a merger), the comparison is done with respect to both the mean and median of each group. Table 1 shows the results of the test of difference in means and medians of the pre-merger characteristics of the acquired and acquiring companies compared with their industry averages. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum test 111 is used to test the difference in the median between the two groups. In all cases, the t-test at two-tailed statistical significance levels was applied for the variables, since it was unclear a priori whether the difference would be positive or negative for the profits and other factors. Table 1 indicates that, on an average, the acquirers were high growth firms, which had improved their performance over years prior to merger and had a higher liquidity. The acquired firms, on the other hand, were mainly firms with performance that was at the industry average levels. However, as discussed earlier, the selected sample of firms had a selection bias. In such a situation, the merging firm characteristics distinguished from those of the industry could be better described by comparing the median of the two groups. On the basis of the median comparison, it was seen that the firms involved in merger were significantly smaller in size with a lower growth rate than the rest of the industry. The firms had, however, higher than industry levels of profitability. The acquirer had a significantly lower pre-tax ratio as compared to the industry and a liquidity ratio at industry levels. The acquired firms had liquidity lower than the industry, which does not support our initial hypothesis that acquired firms would have higher levels of liquidity. Both these observations do not support our initial premise that merger took place due to any tax or liquidity related strategic benefits to the acquirer.
In the sample of the merging firms, we next try to distinguish the characteristics of the firms that were acquired from those that had taken over these firms (the acquirers). As shown in Table 2 , there is no significant difference in the size, capital structure or tax provision ratio of the two firms. The acquirers were firms with higher average growth rate and average liquidity than the acquired. The comparison of medians shows that acquirers were highly profitable firms than those that were acquired.
Effect of Merger
The impact of merger was studied by comparing the post-merger performance of the acquirer with its pre-merger performance. All variables were adjusted for industry average. The size of the acquirer was significantly larger after merger. The immediate (absolute) growth of the acquiring firm subsequent to the merger (compared with the pre-merger position) has been distinguished from the change in the annual rate of growth in the years following the merger. There is no doubt that the first type of growth is achieved, by definition, through merger. The increase in assets for the 36 acquiring firms in the merger year was 43 per cent. The average annual growth rate over the three years prior to merger and the three postmerger years was nearly the same at around 16 per cent to 17 per cent. The growth in sales and operating income for the acquiring firms in the merger year was 39 per cent and 185 per cent respectively. The annual average growth rate over the pre-merger period and the post-merger period was less than 20 per cent." From Table 3 it is seen that merger resulted in an expected once-and-for-all increase in assets, sales, and operating profit margin. The difference at the average showed that there is no increase in the growth rate of the acquiring firm in subsequent years. However, the median indicates an increase in growth rate in postmerger years.
Merger has a negative impact at average and no impact at median of the acquirer performance as indicated by all the profitability measures. Instead of just comparing the profitability measures at the pre-and post-merger levels, we also compare the post-merger profitability with the weighted average of pre-merger acquirer and acquired firm profitability. This measure shows no significant gains in profitability in the post-merger period. There was a significant increase in the leverage of the acquirer. Overall, the effect of merger is seen in significant increase in size (once-and-for-all growth) and financial synergies (increased leverage).
Effect of Merger on Profitability
In a finite sample period, the population of all firms would change since there would be new entry and exit from the industry. The entry could be through merger of an established firm with an incumbent. Similarly, the merger of an incumbent would lead to its exit from the industry. This process of restructuring of the firm, primarily through mergers, makes it difficult to construct a sample of firms that can be analysed with long-run data to isolate the effect of a merger. Hence the short-run data for a merging firm was considered, which was long enough for pre-and post-merger period, so as to capture the merger effects. The next section describes the model developed by Cosh et al., (1998) which has been used here to analyse the effect of merger on profitability.
The Model
The model to test for the existence of persistence of profits, in firm i at tim^ t, expressed relative to industry profits, is given by:
(1) where π it is the excess profitability given as the difference between profitability of firm at time t and profitability of industry i at time t and X it are the exogenous variables.
In the above model, the term 'α + ß X it captures the factors which systematically influence excess profitability (Π IT , while the intercept a. captures the factors which influence firm fs profits and which are not time varying. ß is assumed to be common for all firms. The coefficient A indicates the degree of inertia or subsidiary firms suggesting that it was more a part of the restructuring activities by the firms in response to the changes in the industrial policy. However, this restructuring was not seen to improve the profitability of the firms in the post-merger period.
Comparing the performance of the firms involved in merger with a firm which was not involved in merger shows that if no merger had taken place, the post-mergei period profitability would have improved. Merger had a negative impact on the profitability. If the firms with a higher than industry average performance would takeover a firm with lower than industry average profitability and size, then there is an average of performance with merger. However, in our case, both the firms were at the industry performance levels and the merger did not lead to an increase in profits. In terms of the regression to norm, it was seen that there is a significant amount of persistence of profits of the firm and it was not significantly affected by Vol. 26, No. 1, January-March 2001 merger. This implies that the competitive process was not impeded with merger. In other words, it was seen that mergers did not lead to monopoly effects in terms of increased rents.
Attributing most of the mergers to the restructuring process also explains the case that there was the existence of regression to norm of the firm profitability to the industry average but contradictory to the other studies (Cosh et al, 1998; Mueller, 1986) , there was no significant increase in the rate of regression of profits to norm with merger (accelerating effect).
In terms of the policy implications, this research is a contribution to the empirical research on corporate strategy rather than as a guide to specific policies -public or private. Most diversification and expansion decisions had been influenced by the government policies until 1991. Not much work had been done later that would provide insights into the situation in the post-liberalized era. 
